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Human communication systems evolve culturally, but the evolutionary
mechanisms thatdrive this evolutionarenotwell understood.Against abaseline
that communication variants spread in a population following neutral evol-
utionary dynamics (also known as drift models), we tested the role of two
cultural selection models: coordination- and content-biased. We constructed a
parametrized mixed probabilistic model of the spread of communicative
variants in four 8-person laboratory micro-societies engaged in a simple
communication game. We found that selectionist models, working in combi-
nation, explain the majority of the empirical data. The best-fitting parameter
setting includes an egocentric bias and a content bias, suggesting that partici-
pants retained their own previously used communicative variants unless they
encountered a superior (content-biased) variant, in which case it was adopted.
This novel pattern of results suggests that (i) a theory of the cultural evolution
of human communication systems must integrate selectionist models and
(ii) human communication systems are functionally adaptive complex systems.1. Introduction
Human communication systems, such as language, evolve culturally [1,2]; the
diverse range of words and grammatical forms used in today’s language
families can be traced back to a common ancestor [3–7]. The precise mechanism
behind the spread of communicative variants, however, is not clear. Neutral
evolution (also known as ‘drift’) models have been used to explain the evol-
ution of human communication systems [8–10], and cultural evolution more
generally [11,12]. Under this account, cultural change is unbiased: for instance,
vocabulary, baby names [11] and pottery designs [12] have been found to
spread through random copying. This is a neutral account because all variants
encountered are considered equal candidates for copying. This paper shows
that drift alone is insufficient to explain the evolution of human communication
systems. We demonstrate that selectionist cultural evolutionary pressures are
necessary to fully explain the rapid propagation of communication variants
in a population of interacting human agents.
In any finite evolving population, the frequencies of different variants are
affected by drift, but not by selectionist forces; for this reason, drift can be
taken as the null hypothesis against which selection can be tested [13–15].
While drift is the null hypothesis for several models of cultural evolution
[8–10], it does not always adequately explain empirical results [10,16]. In
alternative cultural-selectionist models variant adoption is biased. Theoretical
models of human communication argue that during conversation interlocutors
are biased to adopt the same labels and other aspects of linguistic represen-
tation (including prosody and syntax) [17]. This alignment mechanism has
been extended by computer simulation to account for the emergence of linguis-
tic conventions: when agents are biased to match the linguistic behaviour of
their interlocutor, a single variant can propagate across a population of interact-
ing computer agents [18,19]. This behaviour-matching account operates at the
level of the individual. We call it the coordination-biased model. Under a different
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Figure 1. Cultural evolution of the signs used to represent soap opera in an 8-person micro-society (from [29]). Columns correspond to participants (P1–P8) and
rows to generations (G1–G7). Capital letters (AA, BB, CC, DD) indicate the different participant pairings in a given generation, and colours indicate the different
variant types. When participants played with their first partner (generation G1), they used a variety of different signs: a bar of soap and a musical note (red variant),
a television (green), a shower (blue) and a love heart (yellow). At generation G1, participants tended to adopt the sign their partner produced. As they interacted
with the other members of their micro-society, the soap and musical note (red variant) propagates until everyone is using a refined version of this sign (either soap,
a musical note or both) by generation G4. Note that participants retain their initial variant until they encounter the soap and musical note variant (red), after which
they only use this variant. This suggests a strong content bias for the soap and musical note variant (red) such that it was more likely to be adopted by participants
compared with its competitors in this particular micro-society. In each micro-society, participants communicate 16 concepts, giving 64 distinct data structures like the
above (a total of 3584 signs).
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functional selection [10] or replicator selection [16], variant
adoption depends upon the intrinsic value of the particular
variant. For example, variants that are easier to learn or use
have an increased likelihood of being adopted, and therefore
propagate in populations faster than a neutral drift model
would predict. This second alternative account operates at
the level of the cultural variant. Following Boyd & Richerson
[20], we call it the content-biased model. For a discussion of the
other types of cultural bias that can affect social learning, see
[20,22]. Against a baseline drift model, this paper tests the
coordination- and content-biased selection models’ ability
to explain the spread of communication variants in an exper-
imental micro-society. It examines for the first time the
explanatory power of each evolutionary account and the
interplay between them before concluding that a theory of
the cultural evolution of human communication systems
must integrate the two selectionist models.
Laboratory experiments are being increasingly used to
study the mechanisms that underpin cultural evolution (for
reviews, see [23,24]). By virtue of their ability to control
and manipulate variables of interest, experiments allow
researchers to test specific hypotheses about the social learn-
ing mechanisms critical to cultural change. Artificial
language learning studies have been used to study the evol-
ution of language-like structure [25–27], and experimental-
semiotic studies have been used to study the evolution of
sign systems [28–32]. This paper models the results of anexperimental-semiotic study, where human participants com-
municate a set of fixed concepts by drawing on a shared
digital whiteboard [29]. In this paradigm, participants are
not allowed to use conventional language (spoken or writ-
ten), forcing them to create a new graphical communication
system from scratch (for a review, see [33]). Participants
were organized into four 8-person micro-societies and com-
municated a list of recurring concepts (e.g. art gallery,
drama, theatre; see the electronic supplementary material, S1
for a full listing) to their partner (i.e. all communication
took place in pairs). After several games, they switched part-
ners and continued in this way until they had interacted with
each of the other members of their group.
Within each micro-society, sign variation was lost as mem-
bers of the group aligned on a uniform inventory of single
sign-to-meaning mappings. A representative example of the
spread of a cultural variant for the concept soap opera within a
micro-society is given in figure 1. Across micro-societies sign
variation increased:differentmicro-societies alignedondifferent
inventories of sign-to-meaningmappings. To be clear, therewas
no common pattern in the communication systems that evolved
across the different isolated micro-societies; different micro-
societies developed different ‘dialects’. Analogous to the great
variety of human languages [34], sign diversity was a defining
outcome of communication in the separate populations.
What cultural evolutionary dynamics best explain the
change in frequencies of the communication variants within
each experimental micro-society? To answer this question,
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Figure 2. Three data structures that reflect the changing frequencies of the variants used to communicate soap opera (panel (a), from figure 1), microwave (panel
(b); see the electronic supplementary material, S2) and Brad Pitt (panel (c); see the electronic supplementary material, S3). Columns correspond to participants
(P1–P8) and rows to generations (G1–G7). Capital letters (A with A, and so on) indicate the different participant pairings in a given generation, and colours
indicate the different variant types. Boxes with a solid border indicate the participant that drew second in their pair.
Table 1. Descriptive information about the number of variant types found
at each generation in the 64 data structures.
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7
mean 4.19 3.23 2.55 2.25 1.92 1.81 1.64
s.d. 1.39 1.22 1.08 1.07 0.93 0.87 0.76
max. 7 6 5 5 4 4 3
min. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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of interactions of the experimental micro-societies collected
by Fay et al. [29]. This model included parameters for coordina-
tion bias, content bias, memory size and mutation; the drift
baseline condition is modelled by setting the coordination-
and content-bias parameters to zero. The fit of possible
parameter combinations was then assessed against the empiri-
cal data. Simulating the behaviour of corpus data collected
under controlled laboratory conditions minimizes the effect
of extraneous variables and increases our confidence in the
explanatory power of the model.2. Material and methods
(a) Data
The data to be evaluated, collected by Fay et al. [29], are struc-
tured by micro-society (the four distinct 8-person groups) and
by concept (the 16 concepts in electronic supplementary
material, S1), yielding a total of 64 data structures like the one
illustrated in figure 1. Each data structure includes 56 represen-
tations of the concept: one drawing per participant in each of
the seven generations. The 56 representations in each data struc-
ture were classified into distinct variants (denoted by colour),
reflecting common features and structure. The modelled data
are available at http://comlab.me/ComLab/Selection.html.
The first step of coding each data structure established the
initial state of the communication system, labelling the distinct
variant types at generation 1. In the case of figure 1, four variant
types were identified (red, green, blue and yellow). Because a
variety of distinct signs were used to communicate each mean-
ing, and because different micro-societies used different signs
to communicate the same meaning, a unique coding scheme
was developed for each data structure. The substantial sign vari-
ation made coding the different variants at generation 1
straightforward. The second step tracked the spread of the var-
iant types across the subsequent six generations taking into
account similarity and descent (whether the producer of a var-
iant had seen that variant before and therefore could be
reproducing it rather than independently inventing it). The 64
data structures were coded in this way by two coders (T.M.E.
and N.F.), and a third coder (M.T.) resolved any coding conflicts
(nine coding conflicts arose: 14.06% of the data structures, and
0.0025% of the variants). Three illustrative coded data structures
are shown in figure 2.
Many data structures started offwith a large number of variant
types and lost diversity over the generations, but others had verylittle diversity from the start, and in yet others, mutation intro-
duced variability at later generations. Table 1 quantifies this
heterogeneity by showing the change in the number of variant
types over generations 1–7.(b) Model
We constructed a parametrized model of participant variant
choice. Themodel takes as input the history of the representational
variants the participant had used or seen a partner use and returns
a distribution over how they might next represent that concept.
The model takes four parameters as described below.
Memory size (m). Simulations of cultural evolution have shown
that a smaller memory for experienced past variants promotes
more rapid population-level convergence on a single communi-
cation variant [19]. So the model includes a parameter indicating
the maximum amount of history that can influence the variant
choice. Each variant found in the history is marked as either pro-
duced by the participant (E for ego), or by one of their partners
(A for allo). A memory size of m means that the model remem-
bers at most the last m/2 E-entries hjE,m and the last m/2 A-entries
hjA,m from any history h. The relative frequencies of variants
in hjE,m define the egocentric initial distribution f (hjE,m) and in
hjA,m the allocentric distribution f(hjA,m). Here, f maps a list onto
the relative frequencies of items in that list. Memory sizes of 2, 4,
6 and 8 were examined.
Coordination bias (c) fixes the likelihood of being copied
ascribed to variants produced by others and witnessed by the par-
ticipant, and the variants produced by the participant themself. It
takes values ranging from 21 (fully egocentric: preferring self-
produced variants over other-produced variants) to þ1 (fully
allocentric: preferring other-produced variants over self-produced
variants). Zero coordination bias treats variants in hjE,m and in hjA,m
as equally worthy of reproduction, i.e. unbiased. For brevity,
we sometimes use an affine transformation g ¼ (c þ 1)/2 of
Table 2. Levels of each parameter examined.
type variable no. levels levels
explanatory content bias 11 b ¼ 0.0 to 1.0 in steps of 0.1
t ¼ 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
explanatory coordination bias 11 c ¼ 21.0 to 1.0 in steps of 0.2
control memory 4 m ¼ 2, 4, 6, 8
control mutation 1 m ¼ 0.02
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
281:20140488
4
 on July 24, 2014rspb.royalsocietypublishing.orgDownloaded from coordination bias as an equivalent parameter. Coordination bias
values from 21 to 1 in steps of 0.2 were examined.
Content bias (t, b) comprises two parameters: the target t of the
content bias, identifying which variant is intrinsically preferred
over the others, and the level b, which determines how much the
target variant is preferred over its peers. If the target variant is
not in memory, content bias is ineffective—you need to be familiar
with a possible representation before you can prefer it. For nota-
tional convenience, we will use b ¼ b(t, hjm) as equal to b
whenever t is found in hjm, but 0 otherwise. This value is one of
the coefficients to the singleton distribution dxt , which is 1 if
t ¼ x, and zero otherwise. The null hypothesis is that the content
bias has level 0, i.e. there is no variant preference. When there is
non-zero content bias and the biased variant is available in
memory, the existing distribution is scaled by (12 b) and then b
is added to the probability of the target element t. Content bias
takes values from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.1.
A drift model has a coordination bias of 0 and a content bias
of 0.
Mutation rate (m). On rare occasions, participants generate
novel variants not seen in their history. To capture this possi-
bility, the combined distribution is linearly combined with a
flat distribution w(x) weighted by the mutation rate. If the
mutation rate is 2%, then 98% of variant choices will reflect the
combined distribution, while 2% will be a random choice
among all possible variants. The mutation rate is a constant par-
ameter, fixed across all communities, participants and concepts.
The rate of new, original variants in the data in [29] was found
to consistently fit a mutation rate of 2%, so the parameter was
fixed at this value.
Together the parameters define the probability distribution
shown in equation (2.1), varying over potential representational
variants x, for a given history h. The overbar is used for probabil-
istic complement, i.e. a ¼ 1 a.
P(xjh) ¼ mbg f (xjhjE,m)þ mbg f(xjhjA,m)þ mbdxt þ mw(x) (2:1)
Table 2 summarizes the different levels of each parameter
examined. Content bias and coordination bias cover the entire
range of possible values, while (as noted above) mutation is fixed
at a single value. While, theoretically, memory size could take on
larger values, simulations showed that no additional explanatory
value was added by increasing memory size beyond 8.
The conditional probability of an entire data structure for a
given parameter setting is the product of the probabilities of
each choice made (ignoring the first generation, where variant
choice cannot be predicted). These probabilities depend on the
history of the participant making the choice, and on the model
parameters. For each data structure, an exhaustive search was
performed over the values shown in table 2 to find the maxi-
mum likelihood. The parameter combinations with maximum
likelihood were identified.
Anexample of howamodel assigns aprobability to a single var-
iant choice is given in the electronic supplementary material, S4.
Electronic supplementary material, S5 extends this to the
calculation of the likelihood of an entire data structure.3. Results
The values given in table 2 define 484 possible points in the
parameter space. The likelihood of each of the 64 data struc-
tures was evaluated at each point, and the best parameter
setting was retained. The strength of evidence for a bias in
particular data structures was evaluated using a best-account
Bayes’ factor: the maximum likelihood of any model with the
bias divided by the maximum likelihood of any model with-
out the bias. This approach is formally equivalent to Kass &
Raftery’s [35] use of Bayes’ factor, although the thresholds
for different strengths of support differ slightly. Although
Kass & Raftery [35] count strong support from a Bayes factor
of 20, our threshold for significant evidence (in keeping with
the standard p, 0.05 significance criterion) is 19.
Lower memory size (2 or 4) was associated with better
model fit. Contrary to a coordination bias, an egocentric bias
(21.0 to 20.5), where agents tend to re-use variants they have
used previously, was associated with better model fit. Most
data structures are best accounted for with some content bias
(95% of data structures). Although 28% of the data structures
are not distinguishable from a baseline drift account, 72% of
the data structures require a biased account (coordination and
content; figure 3). Although themedian Bayes’ factor for coordi-
nation bias alone and content bias alone is below the significant
evidence criterion of 19 (6.03 and 14.11 respectively), together
they returned a median value of 71.52. This indicates a critical
interplay between the biases: people tend to re-use variants
they have used in the past unless the newly encountered variant
is superior, inwhich case it is adopted (because the content bias
typically overwhelms the egocentric bias).4. Discussion
Using simulations to model the spread of communication
variants in several experimental micro-societies, we extend
neutral models to show that selection models (coordination-
and content-biased) play a crucial role in the cultural evol-
ution of human communication systems. Our key finding
concerns the symbiotic interplay between the two biases
evaluated. The conservative egocentric bias preserves sign
variation by inhibiting the adoption of variants produced
by others (a similar pattern is observed in natural language,
[36]). This bias on its own acts against the convergence of
the population onto a shared inventory of signs. The content
bias is opportunistic: it encourages variant adoption on the
basis of the intrinsic qualities of the encountered variant; if
the newly encountered variant is superior to previously
used variants it is adopted. The biases in combinationmaximize
the chance that a population will converge on the best variant
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Figure 3. Histograms showing the frequency of different levels of (a) memory size, (b) coordination bias and (c) content bias in the best-fit models for the 64 data
structures. (d ) Shows the number of data structures that are explained by the biases. These break down into four types: 23% show significant evidence for content bias but
not coordination bias (green), 16% show coordination (in this case an egocentric bias) bias without content bias (blue), 14% have significant evidence for both (turquoise)
and the remaining 19% show significant evidence for the presence of some bias, but there is insufficient evidence to pinpoint which biases are active (yellow).
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sign variation, giving the overriding content bias a larger, more
competitive inventory of signs to select from. This finding sup-
ports a novel mechanism through which populations converge
on a shared inventory of sign-to-meaning mappings.
Our findings agreewith theoretical and experimental studies
of human communication showing that people tend to align
their linguistic representations [17,37,38]. However, it questions
the mechanism through which alignment is achieved. Rather
than consideralignment to be a result of a low-level coordination
bias, our findings suggest that alignment can also be driven by
higher-level selection in tandem with a resistance to alignment
in the form of an egocentric bias. This interplay between content
and egocentric biases may be especially pertinent in the earliest
stages of language evolution when interlocutors do not already
share an inventory of signs. Furthermore, our empirically
grounded simulations suggest an alternative to agent-based
simulations that show population-level convergence occurs
through reinforcement learning [18] or a coordination bias [19]
(for a review, see [39]).
If a content bias affects the spread of communication var-
iants in a population, then this would be reflected by the
improved functional adaptation of the selected variants. Two
experimental studies examined the intergenerational trans-
mission of the communication systems modelled in this paper
(i.e. the same corpus of variants collected by Fay et al. [29]).
One study [40] examined sign adaptation for comprehension.
Using a speeded recognition task, it showed that the selected
signs (generation G7) were decoded faster and more accurately
by naive learners than the initial signs (generation G1). Another
study [41] examined sign adaptation for production. It showed
that the selected signs (generation G7) conferred specific pro-
duction advantages for naive learners: they were quicker to
recall, were more rapidly executed and were reproduced with
higher fidelity than the initial signs (generation G1). This type
of functional adaptation is precisely what would be predicted
if a content biaswere operating on the communication variants.
A key innovation of this study is modelling the cultural
spread of communication variants within a small-scale andtightly constrained experimental environment. This comp-
lements the modelling of cultural phenomena within large-
scale naturalistic datasets [11,16]. A concern with the latter
approach is its reliance on data derived from an uncon-
strained environment, where multiple distinct biases (e.g.
content, model and frequency bias [20]) may obscure one
another, or unanticipated patterns in the data may be over-
looked in the absence of a clear explanation (e.g. a spike in
the frequency of a particular variant such as a baby name
or dog breed, [42,43]). Although ecological validity may be
compromised, modelling the change in the frequency of cul-
tural variants produced in an experimental setting permits a
higher resolution test of the effect of specific cultural biases
within a smaller, but less noisy, dataset.
There are of course other types of bias that may affect the
spread of communication variants in a population. For
instance, people selectively copy the linguistic behaviour of
those who display traits that are perceived as desirable [44].
This type of ‘model bias’ [20] could not influence the data col-
lected by Fay et al. [29], because participants communicated
anonymously across a computer network. A ‘conformity
bias’ reflects the tendency for people to match their behaviour
to the group norm [45,46]. This study helps explain why
particular variants propagate in a population, at which point
a conformity bias can also apply [47].While the visualmodality
offers benefits for communication over the auditory modality
[31,48], we do not expect differences between modalities to
affect the results presented in this paper [49].
In conclusion, some of the modelled data cannot be dis-
tinguished from neutral drift. Crucially, the majority of our
results indicate an important interplay between content and
egocentric biases in explaining the evolution of human com-
munication systems. Accepting that selection pressures drive
the spread of communication variants supports the view that
human communication systems are functionally adaptive
complex systems [50].
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